Fascism in Practice - Digital Spheres as Landscape by Moussa Saleh

Fascism in Practice – Digital Spheres as Landscape by Moussa Saleh

In the report titled “Roots of Hate — SWANA Region,” produced by Noor, (Noor, 2024) the research team thoroughly analyzes how fascism and fundamentalism permeate daily life in Southwest Asia and North Africa (SWANA). Although the intensity of these ideologies can ebb and flow, many political systems in the SWANA region consistently uphold a formidable framework of regulations, laws, and systemic mechanisms explicitly designed to subdue rights movements, thereby reinforcing the prevailing narrative of the state. This comprehensive analysis delves into the explicit manifestations of cyber violence and surveillance in digital spaces.


Before examining the intricate tools and tactics that exemplify how cyber violence and surveillance mirror state ideologies of fascism, it is vital to reflect on our online existence. The Internet should be understood as an extension of our physical lives—a virtual environment where our online profiles function as our homes and our data acts as our identification. The public discourse we directly engage in translates into our interactions online, shaping our perceptions and influencing societal norms.


The report identifies 2011 as a critical turning point, as it was when governments and political entities within SWANA began to acknowledge the significant influence of digital tools in advancing social movements and facilitating uprisings (Noor, 2024). Tactics such as internet shutdowns, pervasive website censorship, high-tech surveillance mechanisms, and the stringent enforcement of cybersecurity regulations are the epitome of the emergence of digital fascism—a contemporary manifestation of fascist ideologies adapted to the digital realm through the utilization of algorithms and social media channels.


A fundamental driving force behind the burgeoning cyber-surveillance industry is the extensive capitalist infrastructure that monetizes users’ real lives through aggressive data aggregation practices. Although the manipulation of consumer data may not always be overt, state surveillance practices have tangible repercussions on public discourse, legal frameworks, economic structures, and the systematic suppression of groups or ideologies that dissent from the militarized narratives propagated by the state.


By employing ambiguous language such as “protection of family values” and “national security,” these regimes position themselves as custodians of public morality and societal safety. Cybercrime legislation acts as a legitimate instrument to shield the state from perceived foreign threats and subversive ideas that proliferate in online spaces. Fascist systems exhibit remarkable adaptability, enabling them to shift into varied forms while absorbing and controlling narratives to sustain their grip on power. For instance, in Egypt, the government has developed a  significant expertise in obstructing digital access, detaining citizens and activists, and effectively silencing dissenting voices. As of 2021, Egypt had blocked a staggering 638 websites, including 118 connected to media outlets such as Al Jazeera and The New Arab, under Law No. 175/2018, which pertains to the Combating of Information Technology Crimes. Similarly, the UAE’s Federal Law No. 5 of 2012 imposes severe penalties for online expressions deemed insulting or slanderous, stifling free expression. In Jordan, the Cybercrime Law of 2015 curtails journalistic freedoms by imposing fines and prison terms for publishing allegedly defamatory content online. The widespread pattern of internet shutdowns has taken root as a form of digital fascism across nations such as Algeria, Sudan, Mauritania, Syria, and Iran.


This already complex landscape is further complicated by sophisticated surveillance technologies, particularly Pegasus, developed by the NSO Group—infamously known as one of the most advanced Israeli surveillance tools designed to infiltrate devices without detection (NSO Group, n.d.). Governments preferentially employ this technology to monitor dissent and neutralize opposition. Additionally, a significant technology recently highlighted by SMEX in the SWANA region is AppCloud, a pre-installed application on Samsung’s A and M series smartphones (Yunis, 2025). Developed by ironSource, an Israeli-founded company, this bloatware is installed without consumers’ explicit consent during the purchase or phone setup process. It functions as malicious adware, and its former installer, Install Core, has been known to infiltrate various mobile apps and games, as highlighted by experts from Unity (Unity Technologies, n.d.).


Moreover, the report discusses how agents of digital fascism flourish in a culture characterized by informants, often propelled by violence and hate speech. Movements such as the Fetra campaign are a potent example of this phenomenon. As articulated by its campaign lead, Fetra was initiated to counter-narratives from the West that the founders perceived as promoting LGBTQI+ identities within Arab societies. Concerns over Disney’s representations of LGBTQI+ themes catalyzed the campaign’s formation, as its founders feared that these portrayals could negatively influence children and ultimately shape the future values of Arab communities. This campaign encapsulates broader trends within state ideology, where participants align themselves with the state’s framework and narrative to achieve a sense of belonging. While some argue that such campaigns respond to deeply ingrained cultural values, they can also be examined as fragments of a cyclical feedback pattern of states and “citizens.” 


Fascism emphasizes the cultivation of a “New Man” who is physically robust and morally rigid, idolizing attributes perceived as forceful and vigorous while disparaging everything deemed “weak” or “soft,” including traits associated with femininity, queerness, or dissenting perspectives. This high maintenance cycle brings even countries and allies like Egypt and the UAE. In 2014, the UAE provided financial and technological support, including purchasing $11M in espionage software for Egypt, facilitating the expansion of the Egyptian regime’s surveillance capabilities.


Further amplifying the exact nature of values, a Christian fundamentalist group known as “Jnoud El Rab” publicly announced its formation in Lebanon in October 2020. This group rapidly expanded its presence in various Christian-majority areas, including Jdeideh and Zahle, fostering a climate of fear and intolerance. A striking embodiment of the “New Man” ideology, Jnoud El Rab vehemently opposes non-religious viewpoints, secularism, leftist ideologies, and communism while also discriminating against Palestinian and Syrian refugees. 


On August 23, the group notoriously raided a queer bar in Beirut, launching a violent attack that included destroying furniture outside the establishment and assaulting patrons who attempted to escape. Those who remained were subjected to threats of further violence if the bar continued to “promote homosexuality.” The group reinforced its stance with quotes from the Bible, branding LGBTQI+ individuals as “satanic” and asserting that they have no rightful place in Lebanese society. Alarmingly, such extremist actions are indirectly legitimized by the state; in August 2023, two Lebanese lawmakers introduced separate legislative bills explicitly aimed at criminalizing same-sex relations between consenting adults. These bills propose severe penalties, including up to three years in prison for anyone accused of “promoting homosexuality,” further solidifying discrimination and persecution. This push for anti-LGBTQI legislation followed an unlawful ministerial ban on events supporting LGBTQI+ rights in June 2022.


The interplay between social media platforms and the proliferation of fascist ideologies has become increasingly pronounced, especially in the SWANA region. A pivotal study conducted by Human Rights Watch in 2021 documented the targeted harassment faced by LGBTI activists in Tunisia, revealing how law enforcement disproportionately targeted these individuals for mistreatment during protests (Human Rights Watch, 2021). Concurrently, social media has evolved into a breeding ground for harassment, where posts divulge sensitive personal information and incite violence against individuals based on their sexual orientation or gender identity.


In its 2023 report titled “All This Terror Because of a Photo,” Human Rights Watch outlined at least 37 instances of online entrapment and extortion perpetrated by both security forces and private individuals in countries including Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon (Atik, 2023). In these cases, extortionists often impersonated LGBTI individuals to gain trust, subsequently extracting compromising personal information that was used as leverage for blackmail.


Moreover, efforts by LGBTI individuals to report abusive and hateful content on social media platforms have faced significant resistance. Many platforms frequently decline to remove such content, arguing it does not violate their community guidelines. A concerning study by Resolve, covering the period from June to August 2023, documented 574 instances of hate speech directed at LGBTIQ+ individuals in Lebanon, with over half categorized as homophobic and most prominently disseminated through Instagram. 


In January 2025, Meta announced sweeping changes to its content moderation policies across Facebook, Instagram, Messenger, and Threads (Kaplan, 2025). The company has decided to end third-party fact-checking in favor of a “Community Notes” system and to relax certain moderation practices, significantly shifting its focus to severe and illegal content. Critically, Meta has loosened its “Hateful Conduct” policies, now permitting targeted speech based on characteristics such as gender and sexual orientation (de Brún and Sawyeddollah, 2025). This alarming shift raises serious concerns about the potential for increased homophobic and transphobic content online. Furthermore, the termination of Meta’s diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) programs indicates a troubling disengagement from essential diversity efforts.


These changes have ignited strong internal dissent among employees and elicited fierce criticism from various communities, especially LGBTQ+ advocates. They rightfully fear that these policy modifications will put vulnerable users at greater risk.


In May 2024, SMEX’s Helpdesk reported 133 cases of digital threats, which included account suspensions, cyber violence, sexual blackmail, and challenges related to content moderation across the SWANA region (SMEX, 2024). Notably, since October 7, 2023, there has been a marked rise in account suspensions and activity restrictions for journalists and activists in both Lebanon and Palestine, coinciding with escalated military action that targeted narratives sympathetic to Palestinian rights. In August 2024, 41% of cases reported to the Helpdesk were linked to technology-facilitated gender-based violence, highlighting the urgency and severity of the issue.


The examination of digital fascism in the SWANA region reveals that cyber violence and surveillance are not merely side effects of authoritarian regimes; they are essential tools for enforcing strict control over the populace. These governments impose harsh laws that dictate online behavior, deploy advanced surveillance technology, and launch targeted disinformation campaigns to tighten their grip on society. By silencing dissent and marginalizing vulnerable groups—such as ethnic minorities, activists, journalists, women, and LGBTIQ—they dominate social discourse and create an environment where fear stifles free expression.


Social media platforms must be held accountable for their role in this oppressive atmosphere, which further endangers activists, journalists, and marginalized communities. By prioritizing profit over user protection, these companies fail to implement adequate safeguards against harassment and misinformation, thereby amplifying the effects of state-sponsored repression.


To combat digital fascism, we need a robust and strategic response that addresses both state repression and corporate complicity. Strengthening digital security for activists, journalists, and civil society groups is imperative to counter the pervasive threats of surveillance, hacking, and cyber harassment. Utilizing tools like encrypted messaging apps, virtual private networks (VPNs), and secure communication protocols is essential for defending against government digital intrusions.


Avenues for resistance are open and attainable. We must refuse to adopt a passive stance toward digital repression. We must harness our knowledge and robust digital security frameworks to safeguard our identities, expressions, and communities. Utilizing encrypted communication, participating anonymously in online discourse, and engaging in collective defense strategies are not just technical solutions; they are acts of defiance against systems intent on suppression.


The Roots of Hate – SWANA report (Noor, 2024)  is among the first blocks  of understanding the complex system of cyber surveillance and online suppression either by state laws or company policies as a part of the bigger old machine of political fascism (Noor, 2024). This is more clearly reflected as we enter artificial intelligence technology (AI) and the race for dominance. Just this month, President Trump has framed the rise of DeepSeek, a Chinese AI tool published for public use in early 2025, as both a significant challenge and a catalyst for reinvigorating American AI enterprises. Despite operating with seemingly fewer and less advanced chips, DeepSeek has managed to produce models that rival America’s best, challenging the American Nvidia chip company’s dominance in AI infrastructure.


It is time to stop, think, and act. 


Governments and companies in the SWANA are in an excellent position to shape their narrative, supported by the massive machine of cyber surveillance mentioned in the report. The lack of digital literacy among the users in SWANA makes it easier. On the contrary, security tools like trusted VPNs or antivirus are not freely accessible to all users, which leads us to question the capital economy of digital safety. While the report provides detailed insights into financial investments in surveillance technology and data penetration tactics, we must consider it as an invitation to investigate the roots of the digital security economy and the network of dominant companies producing safety tools.


The Internet, which we know as an open space to communicate and organize, is long gone. It is clear how the floating pieces of our lives online are put in place to suppress our narratives and values. Reclaiming these pieces is not easy, but making sure we secure the rest of it is still possible.



List of resources

Atik, C., 2023. “All This Terror Because of a Photo”: Digital Targeting and Its Offline Consequences for LGBT People in the Middle East and North Africa. [online] Human Rights Watch. Available at: https://www.hrw.org/report/2023/02/21/all-terror-because-photo/digital-targeting-and-its-offline-consequences-lgbt [Accessed 14 May 2025].

de Brún, P. and Sawyeddollah, M., 2025. Meta’s new content policies risk fueling more mass violence and genocide. [online] Amnesty International. Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2025/02/meta-new-policy-changes/ [Accessed 14 May 2025].

Human Rights Watch, 2021. Tunisia: Police Arrest, Use Violence Against LGBTI Activists. [online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/02/23/tunisia-police-arrest-use-violence-against-lgbti-activists [Accessed 14 May 2025].

Kaplan, J., 2025. More Speech and Fewer Mistakes. [online] Meta. Available at: https://about.fb.com/news/2025/01/meta-more-speech-fewer-mistakes/ [Accessed 14 May 2025].

Noor, 2024. Roots of Hate: Fascist and Fundamentalist Narratives & Actors in South-West Asia and North Africa Regions. [online] Available at: https://wearenoor.org/roots-of-hate-swana/ [Accessed 14 May 2025].

NSO Group, n.d. Cyber intelligence for global security and stability. [online] Available at: https://www.nsogroup.com/ [Accessed 14 May 2025].

SMEX, 2024. Digital Safety Helpdesk Statistics: Rising Electronic Repression in the Region. [online] Available at: https://smex.org/digital-safety-helpdesk-statistics-rising-electronic-repression-in-the-region/ [Accessed 14 May 2025].

Unity Technologies, n.d. Unity Real-Time Development Platform | 3D, 2D, VR & AR Engine. [online] Available at: https://unity.com/ [Accessed 14 May 2025].

Yunis, R., 2025. Invasive Israeli software is harvesting data from Samsung users in WANA. [online] SMEX. Available at: https://smex.org/invasive-israeli-software-is-harvesting-data-from-samsung-users-in-wana/ [Accessed 14 May 2025].

About the author

Moussa Saleh is a digital rights defender and queer activist from Lebanon. Since 2019, he has led several projects on building communities and facilitating knowledge sharing on digital literacy, sexual and reproductive health and rights, media capacity building, and journalist support. Moussa is the co-founder of Resolve, a digital rights initiative focusing on technology-facilitated gender-based violence, intending to counter hate speech and spread digital literacy between LGBTQIA+ people and women.