When a Revolution Unravels
As a Black Tunisian feminist who lived through the revolution and now navigates the attempts to undo it, I have witnessed the promise of 2011 steadily unravel into a new authoritarian order.
Before 2011, Ben Ali’s dictatorship had extinguished nearly every form of hope and community organizing (Amnesty International, 2022). And then, almost like magic, the revolution erupted. I was nineteen at the time, and in many ways, my own trajectory unfolded alongside Tunisia’s democratic experiment, more precisely, its democratic transition. We grew and flourished together. In 2011, both the country and I were in our formative phase, sustained by hope, energy, and an unshakable sense of possibility. My entire sense of self was shaped by the revolution’s goals and its visions for the future. I even considered 14 January 2011 (the day of the revolution) as my symbolic birthday, the moment when we were finally recognized as citizens and allowed to feel a genuine sense of belonging to this country.
It is important to recall that Tunisia has long occupied an exceptional place in the SWANA region, not only for igniting what was later termed the Arab Spring (Human Rights Watch, 2022). We were among the first states to abolish slavery in 1846 (International Crisis Group, 2021). The Personal Status Code of 1956 marked a significant leap in women’s rights, criminalizing polygamy and decriminalizing abortion (Legal Agenda, n.d.). More recently, in 2018, we enacted two landmark laws: one aimed at eliminating all forms of violence against women (Al Jazeera, 2021) and another criminalizing racial discrimination (Amnesty International, 2021).
Yet despite these achievements and despite the hope and vibrant civic space that emerged after 2011, the backlash we are experiencing today is unprecedented. It is brutal, abrupt, and emboldened by a transnational ecosystem of anti-rights movements (Human Rights Watch, 2021).
What is unfolding in Tunisia is not an anomaly; it is a case study in how a revolution is dismantled, incrementally and systematically, under the guise of national salvation.
From Revolution to Rupture: The Conditions That Enabled Authoritarian Revival
The transition was initiated by one major milestone: the election of the Constituent Assembly at the end of 2011 (The Carter Center, 2014). Its most valuable outcome was the new constitution, adopted in 2014, which we celebrated as a collective triumph (International IDEA, 2017). The most significant institutional shift was the move from a presidential to a parliamentary system. Opposition leaders who had spent years in exile or in prison returned to participate in the elections (Tunisia Truth and Dignity Commission, n.d.). The paradox, however, was that the Islamist conservative party won by a large majority. Yet I would not argue that they reversed the achievements of the revolution. The civic space remained open, and a vibrant ecosystem of human rights movements emerged.
Queer communities claimed visibility, safety, and identity (Reuters, 2017). Feminist groups demanded representation and recognition. Anti-racist organizers pushed for restorative justice and reparations. Environmental justice movements called for structural policy change, etc.
It was far from perfect, and I do not wish to reinforce any romantic illusion; the political and economic crisis was deep and profoundly affected daily life (Amnesty International, 2022). Many people began to regret the revolution, and a new saying circulated everywhere: “Ben Ali, where are you?” It was still a democratic transition, but a fragile one.
Corruption remained widespread (Human Rights Watch, 2015), and the country endured several terrorist attacks, such as the 2015 Bardo Museum attack and the 2015 Sousse beach massacre, which shook public confidence and destabilized the political landscape (BBC, 2015).
One of the most devastating turning points came in 2017 with the adoption of the Administrative Reconciliation Law, which undermined transitional justice efforts by granting amnesty to civil servants involved in corruption under the former regime (Freedom House, 2022). This was followed by the 2022 Penal Reconciliation Decree-Law, which allowed individuals accused of financial crimes to regularize their situation through payments or development projects (OHCHR, n.d.). These measures reopened the door for figures associated with the dictatorship to regain political influence, win seats in parliament, and reassert their power. From there, the crisis intensified.
Parliament became paralyzed (Venice Commission, 2022). Laws were blocked amid endless disagreements, and the mediocrity of decision-makers became unbearable. We found ourselves trapped between their political battles, battles that were petty, shallow, and detached from people’s real struggles. Such a widening gap between institutions and citizens inevitably fueled public resentment (Council of Europe, 2022).
As activists and community organizers, we initiated a series of large protests in 2021, which Kais Saied, the President of Tunisia, ultimately instrumentalized on July 25, 2021, to justify his constitutional coup d’état (Human Rights Watch, 2023). He invoked Article 80 of the Constitution, which grants the President exceptional powers in situations of national crisis. People celebrated in the streets, and an informal movement called “the state of consciousness” emerged to support him. The fragmentation of society, combined with exhaustion and disappointment, amplified the desire for a strong leader, and his monopolization of legislative and executive powers, along with his direct influence over the judiciary, became normalized and even legitimized (Amnesty International, 2023). He was seen as a savior.
This was only the beginning of a new era, the backlash era.
Manifestations of Fascist and Fundamentalist Logics in Today’s Tunisia
As the democratic horizon closed, fascist and fundamentalist logics began to saturate Tunisia’s political and social landscape (Reporters Without Borders, 2023). Their presence is not abstract. They are visible in the language the state uses, the bodies it targets, the actors it empowers, and the violence it legitimizes. In this section, I trace how these logics have materialized in our institutions, our streets, our online spaces, and even within the intimate spaces of identity and belonging, reshaping what it means to live, orga nize, and resist in Tunisia today.
The Pattern: Political Division, Digital Harassment, and Political Persecution
By 2022, Kais Saied had written an entirely new constitution in a silo and transformed Tunisia from a parliamentary system into an ultra-presidential regime (Al Jazeera, 2025). The new constitutional architecture grants the president the power to appoint judges to the Constitutional Court and significantly weakens both parliament and local collectivities (ARTICLE 19 MENA, 2023). He framed these reforms as a return to constitutional order, relying on the legitimacy of his background as a constitutional law professor to justify the concentration of power.
During this period, the political discourse began to shift and slowly settle into a clear authoritarian pattern. One of the president’s main tools was division. He positioned himself as the protector of the nation and labeled all forms of dissent as treason, conspiracy, or attempts to destabilize the state (Amnesty International, 2024). Minor critiques were reframed as existential threats in all of his public appearances. This rhetorical strategy prepared the ground for the reinforcement of the security apparatus and police unions, which increasingly acted as political actors rather than neutral public servants (Human Rights Watch, 2022). Their power expanded to the point that criticism became nearly impossible without risk.
Another central tool serving the regime has been coordinated online campaigns and digital intimidation, particularly targeting queer communities, feminist activists, and anti-racism movements. These groups are already marginalised in a conservative societal context, which makes them easier to isolate morally and politically.
Online harassment is not merely a tool of intimidation. It goes far beyond affecting the mental or physical health of opponents. It functions as a preparatory stage for arrest. It mobilises public opinion, frames opponents as threats, and shapes a climate where repression becomes not only socially acceptable but also actively encouraged by large segments of the public (OHCHR, 2023).
A concrete example of this strategy is what happened to Voice of Black Tunisian Women, the informal collective I co-founded to focus on the intersection between race and gender and create safe spaces for Black Tunisian Women. During one of our online/virtual webinars held in 2024, the session was hacked, and pornographic images depicting Black people in degrading and submissive positions were projected on the screen. Shortly after, a private video in which I spoke about Blackness was leaked from our closed group without consent and circulated online. Within hours, hundreds of comments flooded our platforms to insult me and question my legitimacy and my “Tunisianity”.
An old pattern has simply intensified. The cycle often begins with online campaigns accusing activists or opposition figures of immorality, corruption, or betrayal, sometimes sex work or drug dealing. Weeks later, formal charges appear. Courts invoke serious accusations, most commonly allegations of plotting against state security. In one of the most emblematic recent cases, a Tunisian appeals court in November 2025 handed down prison sentences of 5 to 45 years to nearly 40 politicians and media figures on charges of conspiracy against state security (International Commission of Jurists, 2023). This mass conviction demonstrates how digital harassment, moral panic, and legal repression now operate together under a unified authoritarian strategy.
Tactics: Repression as a Mode of Governance
Politicians were not the only targets of this backlash. Civil society was also placed under attack. The strategy began by framing external funding for civil society organisations and international human rights institutions as a direct threat to national sovereignty (Amnesty International, 2023).
One clear example is the incident of May 2022, when President Kais Saied declared the members of the Venice Commission persona non grata after the commission issued a report criticising the planned constitutional referendum (The Guardian, 2023). He described their assessment as an unacceptable interference in Tunisia’s internal affairs and even threatened to suspend Tunisia’s membership in the Council of Europe. This discourse did not stop there. It grew into a broader narrative portraying activists and organisations as involved in money laundering or operating against the interests of the state. I am also not fond of external actors interfering in our internal affairs, and I wish it had happened within a decolonized and sovereign framework. But unfortunately, it came as a tool of repression, and state policies were never aligned with that discourse.
The case of the organisation Mnemty illustrates this clearly. Mnemty (meaning “My Dream” in Tunisian dialect) is a Tunisian NGO founded in 2013 by Saadia Mosbah to combat racism and discrimination, promoting a pluralistic society. It was publicly accused of money laundering despite its long record of anti-racism work and community support (Deutsche Welle, 2022). Today, the organisation’s activities are suspended, its president is in prison, and many of its members are either in asylum or banned from traveling, with allegations of crimes carrying sentences that fluctuate between 15 and 30 years.
Other organisations were targeted under the pretext of not complying with the requirements of Decree Law number 2011-88 which regulates associations and NGOs. It is impossible to ignore the pattern. These pressures and accusations affected almost exclusively human rights organisations with a long and respected history. The authorities suspended the activities of groups such as the Tunisian Association of Democratic Women (Carnegie Middle East Center, 2023) and the independent media platform Nawaat (Carnegie Middle East Center, 2023), both of which have been central pillars of civic life in Tunisia.
I must also mention the arrest of two of the most progressive figures. Ahmed Souab is a respected lawyer who was arrested after publicly criticising the conspiracy trial and calling out violations of fair trial guarantees (African Union Commission, 2023). He was charged under terrorism and false news laws. Ayachi Hammami is a long-standing human rights defender who was the second minister after the prime minister and is responsible for human rights and relations with constitutional bodies and civil society. He was arrested at his home and accused of plotting against national security (UNHCR, 2023).
Their arrests became symbolic moments in this crackdown, sending a clear message that even the country’s most established defenders of rights are no longer protected when they challenge the state.
Narratives: Othering, Scapegoating, and the Politics of Fear
The list of people who have been arrested is so long that it would be impossible to name them all, but what matters here is the targeted attack on identity-based movements, especially feminist, LGBTQI+, anti racism and anti-xenophobia activists.
Feminist and LGBTQI+ issues have always been a risky and heavily policed terrain in Tunisia, so what we see today is not a beginning but an escalation, a deepening of repression. (Amnesty International, 2024) As Amnesty International documented, at least 84 people in Tunis, Hammamet, Sousse, and El Kef, mainly gay men and trans women, were arrested, arbitrarily detained, and unjustly prosecuted solely because of their actual or perceived sexual orientation or gender identity (Human Rights Watch, 2023).
I must also admit that the homophobic and misogynistic dynamics have always been embedded in our political and social fabric. The public discourse that emerged after the revolution was never truly progressive, and I do not believe this era was directly targeting these communities. But as the general climate of oppression deepened, it added another layer of fragility and resentment around these issues. What was already a tense terrain became even heavier, amplifying existing tensions and leaving feminist struggles more exposed and vulnerable than before.
A new and deeply dangerous narrative also emerged during this period, which openly attacked Black activists and framed them as attempting to change the “demographic composition” of Tunisia by ‘settling’ Black communities in the country. In other words, the state revived the racist fantasy that Black Tunisians and Black migrants were trying to “Make Tunisia Black again.” This campaign against Black African migrants became one of the clearest failures of the democratic transition because of the severity and scale of its impact. The president’s speech, framed as a measure to protect national identity, was in reality a green light that legitimised long-standing racism and xenophobia and pushed them into the center of public discourse (Amnesty International, 2023).
Violence soared. Black migrants faced beatings, humiliation, theft of their belongings, sexual violence, and arbitrary expulsions carried out without any form of legal process (Human Rights Watch, 2023).
The consequences were immediate and devastating. Hundreds of people were forcibly displaced from their homes, expelled from their neighborhoods, fired from their jobs or evicted in a matter of hours. Large groups were pushed toward the borders with Libya and Algeria. Many were left stranded in the desert without food, water or shelter, and at least 27 persons, including children, died there under unbearable heat and dehydration (Médecins Sans Frontières, 2023).
Delegitimising Black presence also meant criminalising solidarity. Organisations and individuals who provided shelter, legal assistance or basic humanitarian support were harassed, investigated or forced to suspend their work. Several aid workers and public figures were detained simply for helping people in distress or for speaking out against the abuses. Sherifa Riahi, a humanitarian worker with France Terre d’Asile who supported migrants with emergency assistance, was arrested and incarcerated along with two of her colleagues despite the absence of any credible charges (Al Jazeera, 2023). Saadia Misbah S, the founder of the organisation Mnemty and one of the most recognisable voices of anti-racism in Tunisia, was detained and accused of money laundering despite her decades-long record of community work and advocacy (France Terre d’Asile, 2023). Sonia Dahmani, a lawyer and human rights defender who spoke critically about the state’s treatment of Black migrants, was arrested after being physically and violently removed from the premises of the Tunisian Bar Association. (Amnesty International, 2024). These cases sent a clear warning: solidarity itself had become a crime. The result was a climate of fear that dismantled existing support networks and left thousands of people without protection or access to essential services.
As activists know that these accusations are fabricated, the authorities themselves are fully aware of it. Another old technique has intensified: detaining opponents for extended periods without trial. This indefinite limbo becomes a form of punishment in itself. Saadia Misbah, for example, has been held in prison for more than a year with no clarity on her legal status or her future (Human Rights Watch, 2024).
Another powerful technique is arbitrary state violence. As opposition figures, we are unable to decipher the guiding thread or the logic behind this system. We cannot predict which topics require more protection or which forms of activism are supposedly safer than others. Analyzing the president’s tactics has become almost impossible, and this is precisely the point. This strategy aims to prevent us from understanding his logic and from countering it. The ambiguity we are forced to navigate is not accidental; it is calculated and paralyzing.
These are classic techniques. Ambiguity, Populist narratives that blame feminists and LGBTQ+ communities to divert attention from corruption and deep structural changes are used worldwide and have a long history of effectiveness (International Commission of Jurists, 2023). The same applies to conspiratorial, nationalist and purist rhetoric, and to the practice of placing the burden of the economic crisis on migrants (OHCHR, 2022). Added to this is the dictatorship of bureaucracy, where administrative tools are weaponised to oppress and silence (Amnesty International, 2024).
I remain genuinely shocked that such crude political manipulation continues to succeed so effortlessly.
Tactics of Resistance: What We Learn from Fighting Tunisia’s Authoritarian Turn
Resistance will never disappear. It evolves, adapts, and pauses, but human history shows that it always finds a way to reemerge. The first reaction among activists was mostly a collective freeze, and as repression escalated, it pushed us to develop new creative techniques that fit the new realities (Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung, 2022).
Unlearning and Recreating: How Everyday Resistance Transforms
While our old ways of mobilising and advocating continued to prevent dictatorship from fully settling, especially through large protests that signalled public discontent, a large number of activists pressed pause and began questioning these same methods. It became clear that something deeper was needed. A moment of self-critique and unlearning was not only necessary, but it was also inevitable.
The main question that emerged was simple but painful: “What did we do wrong for dictatorship to return after ten years of hard work, system change and policy reform?” And the most honest answer was, “We need to decolonize.”
After the revolution, an enormous number of international NGOs opened offices in Tunisia and countless programs were implemented. As young activists, we received extensive training and resources. This had a positive impact, but it also pushed us to replicate models that do not fit our context. The euphoria that came with freedom left little space for adaptation or contextualisation. Gradually, another realization surfaced: we had drifted away from grassroots communities.
Our narratives did not reflect the concerns of the wider public, and we failed to frame human rights as a path toward socioeconomic justice, which has always been the core concern of most Tunisians (Carnegie Middle East Center, 2022). This disconnect also explains why so many ended up supporting an oppressive regime.
These two shifts are essential if we want to rebuild a revolutionary DNA in Tunisia. We need to root our work in collective identity, reconnect with the value of our heritage and history, and move with steady, grounded steps toward a better future.
Knowledge Production as Long-Term Resistance
This deep questioning naturally led to practical actions. The first step was shifting the narrative and reclaiming our own stories. We needed to truly understand the communities we serve, identify their needs, and find ways to connect with them beyond the formal language of NGOs. Knowledge production became essential for this purpose. It was not only the most strategic tool, but also the safest option in the current climate of repression (Migration Policy Institute, 2023).
Many programmes now operate quietly, often far from the Tunisian capital, and documentation continues even when it cannot be publicly shared. It still guides our actions, shapes our strategies, and strengthens our collective analysis. Research, reports, testimonies, artistic creation, queer feminist and anti-racist analysis all contribute to countering state narratives and preserving memory (European Parliament, 2023).
And at the heart of this shift is a central understanding: producing knowledge is not only a form of resistance, it is also an investment in future democratic rebuilding. Without memory, without documentation, without our stories, there is nothing to rebuild from. Knowledge is what keeps the horizon open when everything else is being shut down (Reuters, 2023).
Diaspora and Transnational Advocacy
Even though many people have been pushed into exile, this displacement has also become a powerful tool for lobbying and community organizing. A significant number of activists are now advocating from Europe, mainly from France, and are working on international pressure strategies. They speak in media and public spaces with a freedom they no longer have inside Tunisia, and many of them truly have nothing left to lose (The Guardian, 2023). It is almost impossible to extinguish the flame and the passion for change that activists carry. These techniques proved effective during the Ben Ali regime, and we still believe they can have an impact today (Freedom House, 2024).
Conclusion
What is happening in Tunisia is not isolated, and it is not a Tunisian exception. It is part of a global pattern in which democracies collapse quietly, sometimes even with popular support, while the world watches in silence. One of the most painful lessons of these years is the absence of global solidarity. Organisations that once supported activism in Tunisia have closed their offices. Partnerships have faded. International actors who celebrated the revolution’s early years have retreated, leaving activists to navigate repression almost alone.
At the same time, European institutions continue to treat Tunisia as a “safe democratic partner,” not because they believe it, but because it allows them to justify stricter asylum policies. Tunisia has also become a border guard for Europe, absorbing the violence of migration control and reinforcing the anti-Blackness that already shapes our social fabric. This is not a coincidence, and it is not neutral. It is a system where borders, racism, and authoritarianism reinforce one another.
The techniques used by the current regime also mirror global authoritarian trends. We see echoes of the Trump-era executive orders, moral panics about gender and sexuality, securitisation, attacks on NGOs, and racialised nationalism. Authoritarian regimes borrow from each other. They learn from each other. And the silence of the international community only makes them bolder.
Yet despite all of this, resistance persists. It transforms, it hides, it reappears, it rebuilds itself from the margins. This is our political inheritance and the most precious thing we have left. Tunisia teaches us that revolutions do not die in a single moment. They erode slowly, but they also reassemble quietly in the cracks of the present. And if there is one certainty, it is that people will resist again. They always do.
List of resources:
African Union Commission (2023) Statement on xenophobia and racial violence in Tunisia. Available at: https://au.int/en/pressreleases
Al Jazeera (2021) Tunisia crisis: What led to Kais Saied’s power grab? Available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/7/27/tunisia-crisis-what-led-to-kais-saieds-power-grab
Al Jazeera (2023) Tunisia abandons migrants in desert border zones. Available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/9/12/in-tunisia-refugees-and-migrants-are-expelled-to-the-desert-left-helpless
Al Jazeera (2025) Tunisia hands long prison sentences to opposition, business, and media figures. Available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/11/28/tunisia-hands-long-prison-sentences-to-opposition-business-media-figures
Amnesty International (2021) Tunisian authorities must rein in security forces. Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2021/01/tunisia-authorities-must-rein-in-security-forces/
Amnesty International (2022a) Tunisia: Freedom of expression increasingly under threat. Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2022/03/tunisia-new-anti-speculation-law-threatens-freedom-of-expression/
Amnesty International (2022b) Tunisia: Deepening human rights crisis. Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2022/12/tunisia-deepening-human-rights-crisis/
Amnesty International (2023a) Tunisia: Authorities escalate crackdown on civil society. Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/02/tunisia-crackdown-on-civil-society/
Amnesty International (2023b) Tunisia: Arbitrary arrests of critics. Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/05/tunisia-arbitrary-arrests/
Amnesty International (2023c) Tunisia: Crackdown on migrants and refugees. Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2025/11/tunisia-rampant-violations-against-refugees-migrants-eu-risks-complicity/
Amnesty International (2024a) Tunisia: Alarming trend of prosecuting activists under Decree 54. Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2024/03/tunisia-prosecution-under-decree-54/
Amnesty International (2024b) Tunisia: Detention of anti-racism activist Saadia Mosbah. Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2024/05/tunisia-repressive-crackdown-on-civil-society-organizations-following-months-of-escalating-violence-against-migrants-and-refugees/
Amnesty International (2024c) Human rights in Tunisia. Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/middle-east-and-north-africa/north-africa/tunisia/report-tunisia/
Amnesty International (2024d) Tunisia: Wave of arrests targeting LGBTQI people. Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2025/02/tunisia-authorities-step-up-crackdown-on-lgbti-individuals-with-wave-of-arrests/
ARTICLE 19 MENA (2023) Decree-Law 54 and criminalisation of free expression. Available at: https://www.article19.org/regions/mena/
BBC (2015) Sousse attack: What happened? Available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-33306597
Carnegie Middle East Center (2022) Why Tunisia lost faith in democracy. Available at: https://carnegieendowment.org/middle- east/diwan/2024/07/tunisias-pathway-to-democracy-truth-or-fallacy?lang=en
Carnegie Middle East Center (2023) Authoritarian resilience in Tunisia. Available at: https://carnegie-mec.org/2023/04/13/authoritarian-resilience-in-tunisia-pub-89763
Council of Europe (2022) Statement on Tunisia and the Venice Commission. Available at: https://www.coe.int/en/web/portal/news-2022
Deutsche Welle (2022) Tunisia: How Saied rewrote the constitution. Available at: https://www.dw.com/en/tunisia-how-saied-rewrote-the-constitution/a-62592768<
European Parliament (2023) Tunisia: Political crisis and EU migration cooperation. Available at: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/
France Terre d’Asile (2023) Tribune: Trois membres de France Terre d’Asile sont emprisonnés à tort en Tunisie. Available at: https://www.france-terre-asile.org/communiques-presse/communiques-de-presse/tribune-trois-membres-de-france-terre-d-asile-sont-emprisonnes-a-tort-en-tunisie-liberez-les
Freedom House (2022) Tunisia: Country report. Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/tunisia/freedom-world/2022
Freedom House (2024) Tunisia: Nation in transit report. Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/country/tunisia/freedom-world/2024
Human Rights Watch (2015) Tunisia: Bardo attack kills 19. Available at: https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/03/19/tunisia-bardo-attack-kills-19
Human Rights Watch (2021a) Tunisia: President’s power grab threatens rights. Available at: https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/08/27/tunisia-presidents-power-grab-and-absent-constitutional-court
Human Rights Watch (2021b) Tunisia: Crackdown on critics escalates. Available at: https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/10/29/tunisia-crackdown-critics-escalates
Human Rights Watch (2022a) Tunisia: Police unions undermine rule of law. Available at: https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/10/10/tunisia-police-unions-undermine-rule-law
Human Rights Watch (2022b) Tunisia: Widening crackdown on civil society. Available at: https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/02/06/tunisia-widening-crackdown-civil-society
Human Rights Watch (2023a) Tunisia: Racist violence targets Black migrants and refugees. Available at: https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/03/10/tunisia-racist-violence-targets-black-migrants-refugees
Human Rights Watch (2023b) Tunisia: Police beatings, sexual violence and expulsions. Available at: https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/07/19/tunisia-no-safe-haven-black-african-migrants-refugees
Human Rights Watch (2024) Tunisia: Deepening civil society crackdown. Available at: https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/05/17/tunisia-deepening-civil-society-crackdown
International Commission of Jurists (2023a) Judicial independence under threat in Tunisia. Available at: https://www.icj.org/tunisia-judicial-independence-under-threat/
International Commission of Jurists (2023b) Silencing free voices: Tunisia. Available at: https://www.icj.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/Tunisia-Silencing-Free-Voices-_compressed-1.pdf
International Crisis Group (2021) Bouncing back? Tunisia’s post-revolution journey. Available at: https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/north-africa/tunisia
International IDEA (2017) Tunisia’s democratic transition: Analysis and assessment. Available at: https://www.idea.int/publications/catalogue/tunisia-democratic-transition
Legal Agenda (n.d.) Tunisia’s personal status code: How family law defined national identity. Available at: https://english.legal-agenda.com/tunisias-personal-status-code-how-family-law-defined-national-identity/
Médecins Sans Frontières (2023) Dozens stranded in desert after expulsions. Available at: https://www.msf.org/sites/default/files/2024-02/migration%20report_0.pdf
Migration Policy Institute (2023) EU–Tunisia migration cooperation. Available at: https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/eu-tunisia-migration-deal
OHCHR (2022) UN experts warn Tunisia of shrinking civic space. Available at: https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/07/tunisia-un-experts-alarmed-deteriorating-human-rights-situation-lawyers
OHCHR (2023) UN experts warn Tunisia over shrinking civic space. Available at: https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases
Reporters Without Borders (2023) Tunisia: Decline in media freedom under Saied. Available at: ht tps://rsf.org/en/country/tunisia
Reuters (2017) Tunisia approves reconciliation law despite protests. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-tunisia-politics-idUSKCN1BO2BW
Reuters (2023) EU praises Tunisia as safe partner despite rights concerns. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/world/eu-issues-list-safe-countries-migrant-returns-that-includes-egypt-tunisia-2025-04-16/
Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung (2022) Tunisia’s democratic decline and repression of dissent. Available at: https://www.rosalux.de/
The Carter Center (2014) Tunisia’s constitution: Progress and challenges. Available at: https://www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/peace/democracy/tunisia-constitution.pdf
The Guardian (2023a) Tunisia’s democratic backsliding under Kais Saied. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/tunisia
The Guardian (2023b) Border externalisation fuels anti-Black racism in Tunisia. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/
Tunisia Truth and Dignity Commission (n.d.) Transitional justice reports. Available at: https://www.ivd.tn
UNHCR (2023) Tunisia: Migrant expulsions and humanitarian crisis. Available at: https://www.unhcr.org/news
Venice Commission (2022) Opinion on the constitutional referendum in Tunisia. Available at: https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?opinion=1071